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ABSTRACT
We study rerouting policies in a dynamic round-based vari-
ant of a well known game theoretic traﬃc model due to
Wardrop. Previous analyses (mostly in the context of self-
ish routing) based on Wardrop’s model focus mostly on the
static analysis of equilibria. In this paper, we ask the ques-
tion whether the population of agents responsible for rout-
ing the traﬃc can jointly compute or better learn a Wardrop
equilibrium eﬃciently. The rerouting policies that we study
are of the following kind. In each round, each agent sam-
ples an alternative routing path and compares the latency
on this path with its current latency. If the agent observes
that it can improve its latency then it switches with some
probability depending on the possible improvement to the
better path.
We can show various positive results based on a rerouting
policy using an adaptive sampling rule that implicitly ampli-
ﬁes paths that carry a large amount of traﬃc in the Wardrop
equilibrium. For general asymmetric games, we show that a
simple replication protocol in which agents adopt strategies
of more successful agents reaches a certain kind of bicri-
teria equilibrium within a time bound that is independent
of the size and the structure of the network but only de-
pends on a parameter of the latency functions, that we call
the relative slope. For symmetric games, this result has an
intuitive interpretation: Replication approximately satisﬁes
almost everyone very quickly.
In order to achieve convergence to a Wardrop equilibrium
besides replication one also needs an exploration component
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discovering possibly unused strategies. We present a sam-
pling based replication-exploration protocol and analyze its
convergence time for symmetric games. For example, if the
latency functions are deﬁned by positive polynomials in co-
eﬃcient representation, the convergence time is polynomial
in the representation length of the latency functions. To
the best of our knowledge, all previous results on the speed
of convergence towards Wardrop equilibria, even when re-
stricted to linear latency functions, were pseudopolynomial.
In addition to the upper bounds on the speed of conver-
gence, we can also present a lower bound demonstrating the
necessity of adaptive sampling by showing that static sam-
pling methods result in a slowdown that is exponential in
the size of the network. A further lower bound illustrates
that the relative slope is, in fact, the relevant parameter that
determines the speed of convergence.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.2.2 [Analysis of algorithms and problem complex-
ity]: Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems—Routing and
layout; C.2.2 [Computer-communication networks]: Net-
work Protocols—Routing protocols
General Terms
Theory, Algorithms
Keywords
Adaptive routing, Wardrop equilibria, convergence time
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent contributions in the ﬁeld of algorithmic game the-
ory have provided much insight into the structure of Nash
equilibria for routing in networks that lack central coordina-
tion. Prominent results include bounds on the price of anar-
chy measuring the performance loss due to selﬁshness in re-
lation to the centrally optimized solution, see, e.g., [21, 22],
and questions regarding how to design networks such that
equilibria induced by selﬁsh agents coincide with the glob-
ally optimal solution, e.g., by imposing taxes [8, 13] or by
introducing a global instance that controls a small fraction
of the traﬃc [14, 20]. These static analyses of Nash equilib-
ria disregard the question of how an equilibrium is actually
reached. Classical game theory does not give an answer to
this question either. The motivation of Nash equilibria is
based on idealistic assumptions like unbounded rationalityand global knowledge that, however, are rarely fulﬁlled in
real-world networks like the Internet.
In this paper, we study the question of how a large popula-
tion of agents can compute or learn an equilibrium eﬃciently
based on simple sampling and adaption policies. Our mo-
tivation is twofold. On the one hand, we want to support
the previous results about Nash equilibria by showing that
a population of agents following simple, myopic, and reason-
able rules quickly converges to a Nash equilibrium. On the
other hand, we think that our analysis may contribute to
the design of distributed adaptive re-routing protocols that
quickly converge to stable routing allocations. Our study is
based on the well known traﬃc model of Wardrop [23] (see
also [22]) in which each of an inﬁnite number of agents is
responsible for an inﬁnitesimal amount of traﬃc. We imag-
ine that the agents play a repeated game in rounds. In each
round, each agent may compare the latency of his current
route with the latency of another route and switch to the
other route if it promises a better latency. The problem with
this natural approach is that other agents might switch si-
multaneously to the same route so that the latency of an
agent may not improve or even get worse. This way, the
game may get stuck in oscillations. This phenomenon is
also well known in the networks community as the insta-
bilities due to oscillations observed within the ARPANET
project are one of the major reasons why the Internet does
not support adaptive routing, see e.g. [15, 16, 19].
In [12], it was shown that such oscillation eﬀects can be
avoided by letting the agents sample alternative routes at
random and migrate with a probability depending on the ob-
served latency diﬀerence. The weakness of the routing pro-
tocols presented in [12] is that the migration policy depends
heavily on the ﬁrst derivatives of the latency functions: In
order to avoid oscillation the probability to switch to an-
other path is scaled down by a factor that is linear in the
maximum ﬁrst derivative over all latency functions. While
this is eﬀective in avoiding oscillation eﬀects it also slows
down the routing process in a dramatic way. For example,
when assuming linear latency functions the obtained bounds
on the convergence time depend in a pseudopolynomial way
on the ratio between the largest and the smallest coeﬃcient
over all latency functions. Several other approaches (see,
e.g. [2, 3, 6, 7]) tackling similar problems are discussed in
the literature. All of them depend on some kind of net-
work parameter like, e.g., the maximum ﬁrst derivative or
the maximum latency, in a pseudopolynomial fashion. For
a more detailed discussion on related work see Section 1.3.
In this work, we show that the ﬁrst derivative of the la-
tency functions is not the limiting factor in the speed of
convergence towards Nash equilibria. We will provide up-
per and lower bounds that identify the “relative slope” in-
stead of the ﬁrst derivative as the relevant parameter that
determines the convergence time of adaptive routing poli-
cies. This parameter is a generalization of the polynomial
degree of a function. Our approach enables us to obtain the
ﬁrst polynomial bounds on the convergence time of adap-
tive rerouting policies for classes of latency functions with
bounded relative slope, especially for latency functions de-
ﬁned by positive polynomials. Remarkably, some of our up-
per bounds are completely independent of any parameter
reﬂecting the size or the structure of the network but de-
pend only on the latency functions. More speciﬁcally, they
depend in a linear fashion on the maximum relative slope
over all latency functions. Before describing our results in
more detail, let us give the necessary formal deﬁnitions.
1.1 The Model
1.1.1 Wardrop’s trafﬁc model.
We consider a model for selﬁsh routing where an inﬁnite
population of agents carries an inﬁnitesimal amount of load
each [22, 23]. Let E denote a set of resources (edges) with
continuous, non-decreasing latency functions ℓe : [0,1]  →
R≥0. Furthermore, let [k] = {1,...,k} denote a set of com-
modities with ﬂow demands or rates ri, i ∈ [k] such that Pk
i=1 ri = r. We normalize r = 1. For every commodity
i ∈ [k] let Pi ⊆ 2
E denote a set of strategies (paths) available
for commodity i. Let P = ∪i∈[k]Pi and let L = maxP∈P |P|.
By Γ = (E,(ℓe)e∈E,(Pi)i∈[k],(ri)i∈[k]) we denote an in-
stance of the routing game. The instance is symmetric if
k = 1 and asymmetric otherwise. An instance is single-
resource if for all P ∈ P, |P| = 1.
For P ∈ P, let fP denote the volume of agents utilizing
strategy P. A population or ﬂow vector (fP)P∈P is feasi-
ble if for all i ∈ [k],
P
P∈Pi fP = ri. Let fe =
P
P∋e fP
denote the load of resource e ∈ E. Then, the latency of a
resource e ∈ E is ℓe(f) = ℓe(fe) and the latency of a strat-
egy is ℓP(f) =
P
e∈P ℓe(f). By ¯ ℓ(f) =
P
P∈P fP ℓP(f) = P
e∈E fe ℓe(f) denote the overall average latency, and for
i ∈ [k] let ¯ ℓi =
P
P∈Pi(fP/ri)   ℓP(f) denote the average
latency of commodity i.
We are interested in ﬂow assignments that are stable in the
sense that no agent can improve their situation by changing
their strategy unilaterally.
Definition 1 (Wardrop equilibrium [23]). A feasi-
ble ﬂow vector (fP)P∈P is at a Wardrop equilibrium for
the instance Γ if for every commodity i ∈ [k] and every
P,P
′ ∈ Pi with fP > 0 it holds that ℓP(f) ≤ ℓP′(f).
1.1.2 Potential and α-shifted potential.
A natural and nice potential function by Beckmann et
al. [4] allows to formulate the problem of computing a War-
drop equilibrium in form of a convex optimization problem,
see also [22]. The set of allocations in equilibrium coincides
with the set of allocations minimizing the potential function
Φ(f) =
X
e∈E
Z fe
0
ℓ(x)dx .
The allocations in equilibrium do not only all have the same
(optimal) potential but they also impose the same latencies
on all edges. In this sense, the Wardrop equilibrium is essen-
tially unique. Our goal is the design of distributed rerouting
policies that approximate the Wardrop equilibrium. As a
measure for the quality of approximation, we upper-bound
the factor between the potential achieved after a certain
amount of time divided by the minimal potential Φ
∗. Ob-
serve, however, for certain instances of the routing game, Φ
∗
might be zero. In this case, we suggest to shift the potential
by some positive additive term. In general, we consider an
α-shifted potential of the form Φ + α where α ≥ 0 can be
chosen arbitrarily in such a way that, for the given instance,
Φ
∗ + α is strictly positive. Let us remark that shifting the
potential can be interpreted as adding a virtual amount of
α to the latency observed on every path. In fact, this is the
way how our algorithms make use of this parameter.1.1.3 Relative slope
A rerouting policy cannot guarantee convergence to War-
drop equilibria if the latency functions make arbitrarily large
leaps due to minor shifts of the ﬂow. To restrict the number
of agents migrating simultaneously, it must have some in-
formation about the behavior of the latency functions. Our
analysis shows that the following parameter is relevant.
Definition 2 (relative slope). A diﬀerentiable laten-
cy function ℓ has relative slope d at x if ℓ
′(x) ≤ d   ℓ(x)/x.
A latency function has relative slope d if it has relative slope
d over the entire range [0,1] and a class of latency functions
L has relative slope d if every ℓ ∈ L has relative slope d.
The polynomial function ℓ(x) = ax
d has relative slope d
over the entire range. The exponential function ℓ(x) = a  
exp(λx) has relative slope at most λ for x ∈ [0,1] reaching
its maximum λ for x = 1.
We will use the following two facts frequently.
Fact 1. If the function ℓ has relative slope d and if 0 ≤
δ ≤ 1/(2d), then ℓ(x(1 + δ)) ≤ (1 + 2dδ)ℓ(x).
Proof. Let δ ≤ 1/(2d). The derivative ℓ
′(y) of the la-
tency function ℓ at a point y ∈ [x,(1 + δ)x] is at most
d   ℓ(y)/y ≤ d   ℓ((1 + δ)x)/x. This gives
ℓ((1 + δ)x) ≤ ℓ(x) +
Z (1+δ)x
x
ℓ
′(u)du
≤ ℓ(x) + δ x
dℓ((1 + δ)x)
x
.
Hence, ℓ((1 + δ)x) ≤
1
1−δ dℓ(x), and for δ ≤ 1/(2d), ℓ((1 +
δ)x) ≤ (1 + 2δ d)ℓ(x), as desired.
We can generalize the deﬁnition of relative slope to latency
functions that are not diﬀerentiable by requiring ℓ(x(1 +
δ)) ≤ (1 + O(dδ))ℓ(x) for x ∈ [0,1] and δ = O(1/d).
Fact 2. For every ﬂow f, ¯ ℓ(f)/(d + 1) ≤ Φ(f) ≤ ¯ ℓ(f).
Proof. We compare ¯ ℓ and Φ termwise. For the up-
per bound consider a resource e and note that the contri-
bution to the average is ℓe(fe)   fe whereas the contribu-
tion to the potential is
R fe
0 ℓe(x)dx ≤ ℓe(fe)   fe by mono-
tonicity of ℓe. For the lower bound, observe that the ratio R x
0 ℓe(u)du/(xℓe(x)) is minimized if ℓ has relative slope d
over the entire range [0,1], i.e. ℓ( ) is a solution of the func-
tional equation ℓ
′(x) = d ℓ(x)/x for all x ∈ [0,1]. Solutions
of this equation are of the form ax
d. For these functions the
contribution to the average is af
d+1
e whereas its contribu-
tion to the potential is a
1
d+1f
d+1
e which yields the desired
ratio.
1.1.4 AdynamicextensiontoWardrop’strafﬁcmodel.
We analyze rerouting policies on the basis of a dynamic,
round-based variant of Wardrop’s traﬃc model. Each round
starts and ends with a feasible traﬃc allocation in the static
model. The rerouting policies describe the behavior of the
agents from a local point of view. They consist of simple
probabilistic rules specifying whether an agent stays with
his current routing strategy or switches to another appar-
ently better strategy. Our rerouting policies are Markovian,
that is, the behavior of an agent only depends on the traf-
ﬁc allocation at the beginning of the current round and not
on observations made in previous rounds. Following War-
drop’s traﬃc model, we assume that traﬃc is controlled by
an inﬁnite population of agents and we investigate the dy-
namical behavior of the system in the ﬂuid limit, that is, the
rerouting policies of the agents are translated into mean ﬁeld
equations that specify how the population shares allocated
to the paths change from round to round.
1.2 Summary of our results
Let us ﬁrst present our algorithms and results for symmet-
ric games. Some of the results can be generalized towards
asymmetric games as noted after their presentation.
Our algorithms use an adaptive sampling rule in which
paths are sampled with a probability that increases with
the fraction of agents using this path. In its simplest form
our approach works as follows. Consider an agent currently
using a path P. The agent chooses an alternative path Q
with a probability that is proportional to the fraction of
agents using this path. Then the agent compares the laten-
cies on the paths P and Q. If ℓQ is smaller than ℓP the
agent switches from P to Q with a probability proportional
to (ℓP − ℓQ)/(d   (ℓP + α)), where d ≥ 1 is an upper bound
on the relative slope of the latency functions and α ≥ 0. We
can illustrate the power of this simple protocol in terms of a
bicriteria result. We say that a traﬃc allocation is in a δ-ǫ-
equilibrium if almost all agents, i.e. at least a 1−ǫ fraction
of the agents, have a latency close to the average latency,
i.e., their latencies are within a factor of (1 ± δ) of the av-
erage latency. Applying the simple policy described above,
the total number of rounds in which the traﬃc allocation is
not in a δ-ǫ-equilibrium is upper-bounded by
O
„
d
ǫδ2   log
„
Φinit + α
Φ∗ + α
««
,
where Φinit and Φ
∗ refer to the initial and the optimal po-
tential, respectively. Remarkably, this bicriteria bound does
not depend on any parameters describing the size or the
structure of the network. It only depends on a single param-
eter of the latency functions, namely the maximum relative
slope. We also show how this bicriteria result generalizes to
asymmetric routing games. The major disadvantage of the
bicriteria result is that δ-ǫ-equilibria are transient in that
they can be left again once they are reached. For this rea-
son we extend our analysis to approximations of the optimal
potential.
The adaptive sampling rule is inspired by the so-called
replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory where
players compare their payoﬀs with the payoﬀs of other play-
ers that are picked uniformly at random from the set of
all players [24, 11]. This way, the probability to choose a
strategy is proportional to the fraction of players using this
strategy. The strength of this approach is that it ampliﬁes
good strategies in an exponential fashion. In our analysis
this is reﬂected by a geometric improvement of the poten-
tial from round to round until the allocation reaches a state
in which almost all agents have almost the same latency.
The major weakness of this approach, however, is that it
only replicates strategies used by other agents but does not
explore new, unused strategies. Exploring unused strategies,
however, is obviously necessary to ensure convergence to a
Wardrop equilibrium.
We combine exploration based on static, uniform sam-
pling with replication based on adaptive sampling into a dis-tributed algorithm that we call exploration-replication pol-
icy. The agents perform uniform sampling with suﬃciently
small probability. This way, we can guarantee monotonicity
with respect to the potential, i.e., the value of the poten-
tial function decreases from round to round. Unfortunately,
this requires that the probability for uniform sampling is
bounded from above in terms of the reciprocal of the ﬁrst
derivative of the latency functions. Fortunately, because of
the ampliﬁcation eﬀects of the replication, this parameter
appears only logarithmically in our result on the speed of
convergence. We need a few more parameters to describe
this result. Let m denote the number of edges, and L the
maximum path length. Let ℓmin denote a lower bound on
the latency on any edge and ℓ
′
max an upper bound on the
ﬁrst derivative of the latencies. (In fact, it is suﬃcient to
upper-bound the ﬁrst derivate of the latency functions in a
small region around 0.) W.l.o.g., let ℓ
′
max > ℓmin + α. In
our analysis, we need to assume ℓmin+α > 0, that is, the la-
tency functions are strictly positive or, alternatively, we use
a positive shift of the potential function. We show that the
exploration-replication policy if parameterized in the right
way reaches a (1+ǫ)-approximation of the (α-shifted) opti-
mal potential in a number of rounds of order at most
poly
„
d   L
ǫ
«
  polylog
„
m  
ℓ
′
max
ℓmin + α
«
  log
„
Φinit + α
Φ∗ + α
«
.
Let us remark that this bound is polynomial in 1/ǫ and the
description length of the instance if the latency functions
are, e.g., deﬁned in terms of positive polynomials of arbi-
trary degree in coeﬃcient representation. This result about
the speed of convergence with respect to the potential holds
only for symmetric games.
We conclude our analysis with two lower bounds that sub-
stantiate the quality of our results. An important and un-
usual characteristic of our policies is that they make use
of the parameter maximum relative slope in order to en-
sure monotonicity with respect to the potential. Our upper
bounds depend in a polynomial fashion on this parameter.
We present a lower bound showing that this dependence can-
not be avoided by the class of policies under consideration.
In particular, we show a lower bound of Ω(d/
√
ǫ) rounds to
approximate the optimal potential within a factor of 1 + ǫ,
for all Markovian policies that ensure monotonicity with re-
spect to the potential over a basic class of latency functions
with relative slope at most d. The network underlying this
analysis consists only of two parallel links.
Furthermore, we study the necessity of adaptive sampling.
As explained above, we use this technique to enable the pop-
ulation of agents to eﬃciently ﬁnd those paths that can sup-
port a large amount of traﬃc. Observe that we achieve this
goal without providing the agents with pre-knowledge about
the latency functions on particular edges. Our lower bound
documents that adaptive sampling is, in fact, necessary to
quickly converge to a Wardrop equilibrium under these con-
ditions, that is, we present an example where the restriction
to static sampling results into a slowdown of the speed of
convergence that is exponential in the size of the network.
1.3 Related Work
A policy similar to the one described above has been con-
sidered in [11] in a naive way, implicitly assuming that the
agents act sequentially. In particular, all eﬀects of simul-
taneous migrations that potentially cause oscillation eﬀects
and harm network performance are ignored. These prob-
lems are addressed in [12] applying a bulletin board model
inspired by an analysis of load balancing with stale infor-
mation by Mitzenmacher [17]. However, there the bounds
on the time of convergence towards approximate equilibria
are only pseudopolynomial. In particular, the bounds de-
pend polynomially on the maximum slope of the latency
functions and the maximum path length.
Well established heuristics for convex optimization use
similar techniques to ensure convergence. For example, Bert-
sekas and Tsitsiklis [6] describe a distributed algorithm for
non-linear multi-commodity ﬂow in which the amount of
ﬂow that is moved in one step from one path to another de-
pends in a linear way on the reciprocal of the second deriva-
tive of the latency functions. This algorithm can also be
applied to compute Nash equilibria in the Wardrop model
in a distributed way in which case the slowdown is again
linear in the ﬁrst derivative.
The convergence rate of adaptive rerouting policies has
also been studied from the perspective of online learning,
where one aims at minimizing the regret which is deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between a user’s average latency over time and
the latency of the best path in hindsight (see, e.g., [2, 3, 7]).
The bounds obtained here also depend pseudopolynomially
on network parameters.
Even-Dar and Mansour [9] study distributed and concur-
rent rerouting policies in a discrete model. Their study is
restricted to networks with parallel links with speeds. Upper
bounds are presented for the case of agents with identical
weights. Their algorithms use static sampling rules that ex-
plicitly take into account the speeds of the individual links.
Berenbrink et al. [5] present an eﬃcient distributed protocol
for balancing identical jobs on identical machines.
Beckmann et al. [4] show that Wardrop equilibria can be
computed in polynomial time. Fabrikant et al. [10] con-
sider the complexity of computing Nash equilibria in a dis-
crete model. They show that computing Nash equilibria is
PLS-complete in general whereas there exists a polynomial
time algorithm for the case of symmetric network conges-
tion games. In contrast to our work, these are centralized
algorithms whereas we analyze how agents can compute or
learn an equilibrium in a distributed fashion.
Finally, let us remark that our dynamic systems are sim-
ilar to quadratic dynamic systems [1, 18] in that there is an
inﬁnite number of individuals that are mated at random to
produce two individuals as oﬀspring. In general, it is known
that such systems with an inﬁnite number of agents can
solve PSPACE-complete problems in a polynomial number
of rounds and can hence also compute Wardrop equilibria.
However, this approach again only yields centralized algo-
rithms since here, individuals do not have a natural inter-
pretation as participants in a network routing game.
2. THE EXPLORATION-REPLICATION
POLICY
We now formally introduce our rerouting policy for a class
of latency functions with relative slope d. The policy takes
two parameters α and β. In every round, an agent is acti-
vated with constant probability λ = 1/32. It then performs
the following two steps. Consider an agent in commodity
i ∈ [k] currently utilizing path P.
1. Sampling: With probability (1− β) perform step 1(a)and with probability β perform step 1(b).
(a) Proportional sampling: Sample path Q ∈ Pi with
probability fQ/ri.
(b) Uniform sampling: Sample path Q ∈ Pi with
probability 1/|Pi|.
2. Migration: If ℓQ < ℓP, migrate to path Q with proba-
bility
ℓP −ℓQ
d (ℓP +α).
Whereas the parameter α ≥ 0 can be chosen arbitrarily, the
parameter β must be chosen subject to the constraint
β ≤
minP∈P ℓP(0) + α
L   maxe∈E maxx∈[0,β] ℓ′
e(x)
. (1)
In the following, we always assume that this constraint is
satisﬁed. We deﬁne our policy formally by specifying the
amount of ﬂow that is shifted between any pair of paths
within one round.
Definition 3 (Exploration-Replication Policy).
For an instance Γ let d ≥ 1 be an upper bound on the rela-
tive slope of the latency functions and let β be chosen as in
Equation (1). For every commodity i ∈ [k] and every path
P,Q ∈ Pi with ℓQ ≤ ℓP, the (α,β)-exploration-replication
policy migrates a volume of
 PQ = λ  
1
d
  fP  
„
(1 − β)  
fQ
ri
+ β  
1
|Pi|
«
ℓP − ℓQ
ℓP + α
with λ =
1
32 agents from path P to path Q.
In our proofs we will simulate the (α,β)-exploration-repli-
cation policy by applying the (0,β)-exploration-replication
policy to a modiﬁed instance with additional oﬀsets α added
to the path latencies.
Fact 3. Let Γ be an instance of the congestion game and
let Γ
+α be an instance that we obtain from Γ by inserting
a new resource eP for every P ∈ P with constant latency
function ℓeP (x) = α. Let Φ and Φ
+α denote the respective
potential functions.
1. The (α,β)-exploration-replication policy behaves on Γ
precisely as the (0,β)-exploration-replication policy does
on Γ
+α.
2. If Φ
+α(f) ≤ (1 + ǫ)(Φ
+α)
∗, then Φ(f) ≤ (1 + ǫ)Φ
∗ +
ǫα.
2.1 Convergence
In this section we show that our rerouting policy decreases
the potential in every round and that it therefore converges
to a Wardrop equilibrium. Intuitively, the potential de-
creases since agents shift ﬂow from high latency strategies to
low latency strategies. Ideally the agents migrating from a
strategy P to a strategy Q change the potential by  PQ(ℓQ−
ℓP) where  PQ denotes the fraction of these agents. How-
ever, this is not true since the latencies ℓQ and ℓP are not
constant.
The following lemma establishes that the potential gain in
one round of our strategy is at least half of this ideal value.
A similar result has been shown in [12]. However, here we
improve this result for the (α,β)-exploration-replicaiton pol-
icy, which does not satisfy the requirements of [12], and for
latency functions with bounded relative slope (instead of
bounded ﬁrst derivative).
For two ﬂow vectors f and f
′ of consecutive rounds, the
virtual potential gain is the potential gain that would occur
if the latencies were ﬁxed at the beginning of the round, i.e.
V(f,f
′) =
X
e∈E
ℓe(f)   (f
′
e − fe) .
By our policy, this value is always negative. We show that
the true potential gain ∆Φ = Φ(f
′) − Φ(f) is at least half
of V(f,f
′).
Lemma 4. Consider an instance Γ and the (α,β)-explo-
ration-replication policy changing the ﬂow vector from f to
f
′ in one step. Then we have
∆Φ = Φ(f
′) − Φ(f) ≤
1
2
X
P,Q∈P
 PQ (ℓQ − ℓP) =
V(f,f
′)
2
.
The proof extends the arguments given in [12]. We give
bounds on the error terms by which the true potential gain
diﬀers from the virtual potential gain. The proof makes
use of the fact that latency functions have relative slope d
to bound the error terms caused by proportional sampling.
The contribution to the error terms caused by uniform sam-
pling can be bounded since β is chosen according to Equa-
tion (1). Due to space limitations we defer the proof to the
full version.
Corollary 5. The (α,β)-exploration-replication policy con-
verges towards a Wardrop equilibrium.
3. SYMMETRIC GAMES
In this section, we consider the case of symmetric games
where the number of commodities is k = 1. We will ﬁrst
derive upper bounds for the time of convergence towards
approximate equilibria and proceed by giving upper bounds
for the number of rounds until the potential is close to the
optimum.
3.1 Bicriteria Approximation
In this section we will use the following bicriterial deﬁni-
tion of approximate equilibria.
Definition 4 (δ-ǫ-equilibrium). For a ﬂow vector f
let P
+(δ) = {P ∈ P | ℓP(f) ≥ (1 + δ) ¯ ℓ(f)} denote the
set of δ-expensive strategies and let P
−(δ) = {P ∈ P |
ℓP(f) ≤ (1 − δ) ¯ ℓ(f)} denote the set of δ-cheap strategies.
The population f is in a δ-ǫ-equilibrium iﬀ at most ǫ agents
utilize δ-expensive and δ-cheap strategies. We write P
+ and
P
− if δ is clear from the context.
Note that our policy may leave such approximate equilib-
ria again once they are reached. Hence, we bound the total
number of rounds that are not at an approximate equilib-
rium.
Theorem 6. Consider a symmetric congestion game Γ
and an initial ﬂow vector finit. For the (α,β)-exploration-
replication policy, the number of rounds in which the pop-
ulation vector is not at a δ-ǫ-equilibrium w.r.t. Γ
+α (as
deﬁned in Fact 3) is bounded from above by
O
„
d
ǫδ2 log
„
Φ(finit) + α
Φ∗ + α
««
.(1+δ)¯ ℓ
¯ ℓ
x ¯ ℓ
δx ¯ ℓ
y x
Figure 1: The ﬁgure depicts the distribution of the
agents’ latencies. The shaded areas are of the same
size. Since the left area represents the conditional
expectation of the diﬀerence between ¯ ℓ and the la-
tency of an agent with latency in the range [0, ¯ ℓ],
this expectation has a value of at least δ x ¯ ℓ.
In particular, this bound holds for α = β = 0 implying
Γ
+α = Γ.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to consider the case α = 0 (and
Φ
∗ > 0). To see this, assume that the lemma is valid for
α = 0 and consider an instance ˆ Γ and some ˆ α > 0. By
Fact 3, applying the lemma to Γ = ˆ Γ
+ˆ α and α = 0 yields
the assertion of the lemma applied to ˆ Γ and ˆ α.
We estimate the virtual potential gain of a round that
starts which a population that is not at a δ-ǫ-equilibrium.
Recall that the virtual potential gain is the diﬀerence be-
tween the potential of two consecutive rounds assuming that
the latency functions were ﬁxed at the beginning of the
round. The virtual potential gain is actually negative. For
simplicity, here we denote by V the absolute value of the
virtual potential gain. By Lemma 4, the true potential gain
is at least half of the virtual potential gain.
Consider a strategy P ∈ P. As long as we are not at a
δ-ǫ-equilibrium, at least one of the following cases holds.
Case 1. At least ǫ/2 agents utilize δ-expensive paths.
Case 1a. At least a fraction of x ≥ 1/2 agents utilizes δ-
expensive paths. Let y > 0 denote the fraction of agents
utilizing paths with latency at most ¯ ℓ. Consider a random
agent that is sampled by proportional sampling and let Y
denote the random variable that represents its current la-
tency. Let D = E[¯ ℓ − Y | Y ≤ ¯ ℓ] denote the conditional
expectation of the diﬀerence between Y and ¯ ℓ. We have
D = ¯ ℓ −
1
y
0
@
X
P:ℓP ≤¯ ℓ
fPℓP
1
A .
Substituting this into the deﬁnition of ¯ ℓ,
¯ ℓ =
X
P:ℓP ≤¯ ℓ
fPℓP +
X
P:ℓP >¯ ℓ
fPℓP
= y   (¯ ℓ − D) +
X
P:¯ ℓ<ℓP ≤(1+δ)¯ ℓ
fPℓP +
X
P:ℓP >(1+δ)¯ ℓ
fPℓP .
By deﬁnition of x (for an illustration see Fig. 1),
X
P:ℓP >(1+δ)¯ ℓ
fPℓP ≥ δ x ¯ ℓ + x ¯ ℓ
Substituting this for the last sum in the previous equation
and solving for δ x ¯ ℓ yields
δ x ¯ ℓ ≤ (1 − x) ¯ ℓ − y   (¯ ℓ − D) −
X
P:¯ ℓ<ℓP ≤(1+δ)¯ ℓ
fPℓP
≤ (1 − x) ¯ ℓ − y   (¯ ℓ − D) − (1 − x − y) ¯ ℓ
implying D ≥ (δx/y) ¯ ℓ. All agents with latency at least
(1 + δ) ¯ ℓ that sample a path with latency at most ¯ ℓ migrate
to the new path with probability at least δ/d. The probabil-
ity to sample such a path is at least (1−β)y. Their expected
latency gain which is equivalent to their inﬁnitesimal con-
tribution to the virtual potential gain is at least D. In total
there are x ≥ 1/2 such agents. Altogether, the expected
virtual potential gain is
V ≥
λy (1 − β)δ D
d
≥
λxδ
2
2d
¯ ℓ ≥
λδ
2
4d
¯ ℓ .
Case 1b. At least ǫ/2 but at most 1/2 agents utilize δ-
expensive strategies. Then, the virtual potential gain of the
agents leaving δ-expensive strategies is at least
V ≥
X
P∈P+
fP
X
Q/ ∈P+
 PQ(ℓP − ℓQ)
≥ λ
X
P∈P+
fP
X
Q/ ∈P+
„
(1 − β)fQ +
β
|P|
«
(ℓP − ℓQ)
2
dℓP
.
Omitting the term β/|P|, substituting ℓP ≥ ¯ ℓ+δ¯ ℓ and (1−
β) ≥ 1/2 and applying Jensen’s inequality to the last sum
yields
V ≥
λ
2d ¯ ℓ
X
P∈P+
fP
0
@
X
Q/ ∈P+
fQ(¯ ℓ + δ¯ ℓ − ℓQ)
1
A
2
≥
λ
2d ¯ ℓ
X
P∈P+
fP
0
@(¯ ℓ + δ¯ ℓ)
X
Q/ ∈P+
fQ −
X
Q/ ∈P+
fQℓQ
1
A
2
Note that
P
Q/ ∈P+ fQℓQ ≤ ¯ ℓ
P
Q/ ∈P+ fQ since the sum
omits the terms of the expensive strategies Q ∈ P
+. Hence,
V ≥
λδ
2 ¯ ℓ
2
2d ¯ ℓ
X
P∈P+
fP
0
@
X
Q/ ∈P+
fQ
1
A
2
≥
λ(ǫ/2)(1 − 1/2)
2 δ
2
2d
¯ ℓ .
In the last inequality we used the above assumption that P
Q/ ∈P+ fQ ≤ 1/2.
Case 2. At least ǫ/2 agents utilize δ-cheap paths.
Case 2a. At least a fraction of x ≥ 1/2 agents utilizes δ-
cheap paths. This case is symmetric to case 1a. Let y > 0
denote the fraction of agents utilizing paths with latency
at least ¯ ℓ. Consider a random agent that is activated in a
round and let Y denote the random variable that represents
its current latency. Let D = E[Y − ¯ ℓ | Y ≥ ¯ ℓ] denote the
conditional expectation of the diﬀerence by which Y exceeds
¯ ℓ. The proof is now identical to case 1a and again yields
V ≥
λδ
2
4d
¯ ℓ .Case 2b. At least ǫ/2 but at most 1/2 agents utilize δ-
cheap strategies. We can treat the virtual potential gain of
agents moving towards δ-cheap strategies in a way similar
to case 1b.
V ≥
X
Q/ ∈P−
fQ
X
P∈P−
 QP(ℓQ − ℓP)
≥ λ
X
P∈P−
„
(1 − β)fP +
β
|P|
« X
Q/ ∈P−
fQ
(ℓQ − ℓP)
2
dℓQ
.
Now, we use that ℓP ≤ ¯ ℓ−δ¯ ℓ and apply Jensen’s inequality.
V ≥
λ
2d ¯ ℓ
X
P∈P−
fP
0
@
X
Q/ ∈P−
fQ(ℓQ − ¯ ℓ + δ¯ ℓ)
1
A
2
≥
λ
2d ¯ ℓ
X
P∈P−
fP
0
B
@
X
Q/ ∈P−
fQℓQ + (δ¯ ℓ − ¯ ℓ)
X
Q/ ∈P−
i
fQ
1
C
A
2
≥
λδ
2 ¯ ℓ
2
2d ¯ ℓ
X
P∈P−
fP
0
@
X
Q/ ∈P−
fQ
1
A
2
≥
λ(ǫ/2)(1 − 1/2)
2 δ
2
2d
¯ ℓ .
In all four cases we have V ≥
λ ǫδ2¯ ℓ
16 d . Due to Lemma 4
and Fact 2, the true potential gain is
∆Φ ≤ −V ≤ −
λǫδ
2
32d
Φ.
Let Φ(t) denote the potential in the t-th round. Then,
Φ(t) = Φ(finit)  
„
1 −
λǫδ
2
32d
«t
.
Since Φ is lower bounded by Φ
∗ we obtain the desired
upper bound on the number of unbalanced phases.
3.2 Approximation of the Potential
Since δ-ǫ-equilibria are transient we are interested in ap-
proximations of the potential. If Φ
∗ = 0, the potential
cannot be approximated up to a relative factor of (1 + ǫ)
unless exactly optimized. We therefore allow an additional
deviation by an additive term ǫα, i.e., we want to reach a
population with potential at most Φ(f) ≤ (1 + ǫ)Φ
∗ + ǫα.
As discussed above, this is equivalent to adding a virtual
constant latency α to every path. We will start with several
lemmas that can be applied to symmetric games in general
and proceed by analyzing the single-resource case and the
general symmetric case separately.
First we show, that the value of the average ¯ ℓ =
P
e∈E ℓe fe
does not change much within one round unless the potential
does also decrease signiﬁcantly.
Lemma 7. Consider a symmetric routing game and a ﬂow
at δ-ǫ-equilibrium. If the (α,β)-exploration-replication pol-
icy changes the average latency ¯ ℓ in one round by ∆ >
10λ   (2ǫ + 2δ + β) ¯ ℓ, it reduces the potential Φ by at least
∆/(10(d + 1)).
Due to space limitations we defer the proof to the full ver-
sion.
Our analysis of the time of convergence will proceed by
constructing a ﬂow vector in which the latencies of the cheap-
est path and the most expensive used path are close to the
average latency. The following theorem shows that such a
conﬁguration in which all strategies deviate by no more than
a ﬁxed fraction of ¯ ℓ from the average latency of their com-
modity, are also approximations of the optimal potential.
Definition 5 (δ-equilibrium). A population vector f
is at a δ-equilibrium if for every commodity i ∈ [k] and for
every P ∈ Pi it holds that ℓP(f) ≥ ¯ ℓi −δ ¯ ℓ and, in addition,
if fP > 0, ℓP(f) ≤ ¯ ℓi + δ ¯ ℓ.
Lemma 8. For every instance and feasible ﬂow vector f
at a δ-equilibrium, Φ(f)/Φ
∗ ≤ 1 + O (δd).
Proof. Consider the δ-equilibrium ﬂow f for the instance
Γ. For every i ∈ [k] let ℓmax,i = maxP∈Pi,fP >0 ℓP(f). We
extend every strategy P ∈ Pi by a new resource with con-
stant latency δP = ℓmax,i(f) − ℓP(f). Since f is at a δ-
equilibrium, we can be sure that δP ≤ 2δ ¯ ℓ. Let Γ
′ denote
the thus obtained network. Since in Γ
′ all latencies of used
strategies are equal, f is a Wardrop equilibrium in Γ
′ with
ΦΓ′(f) ≥ ΦΓ(f).
Now, consider the minimal potential in Γ, denoted by Φ
∗
Γ.
We have to show that ΦΓ′(f) ≤ Φ
∗
Γ + 2δ ¯ ℓ since this and
Fact 2 imply that ΦΓ(f) ≤ Φ
∗
Γ + 2δ(d + 1)ΦΓ(f) which is
the assertion of our theorem. To see the claim, note that
for every ˜ f it holds that ΦΓ′( ˜ f) ≤ ΦΓ( ˜ f) + 2δ ¯ ℓ. Also, the
constraints for ˜ f under which ΦΓ′ and ΦΓ are to be mini-
mized are identical, i.e., every ˜ f feasible for Γ is also feasi-
ble for Γ
′ and vice versa. By optimality of f in Γ
′, we have
ΦΓ′(f) ≤ ΦΓ′( ˜ f) ≤ ΦΓ( ˜ f) + 2δ ¯ ℓ for any ˜ f and speciﬁcally
for an ˜ f that satisﬁes ΦΓ( ˜ f) = Φ
∗
Γ.
There exist instances showing that the parameters δ and d
in Lemma 8 are actually required.
3.2.1 Symmetric Single-Resource Games
For the case in which every strategy utilizes only one re-
source, i.e., for all P ∈ P, |P| = 1, we can now show con-
vergence towards potential approximations.
Lemma 9. Consider a symmetric single-resource instance
Γ and the (0,β)-exploration-replication-policy. For every
ǫ > 0 deﬁne the following constants.
δ = max
ncǫ
d
,cβ
o
,
δ
′ = ǫ
′ = c
′ δ
2
dlog(|P|/β)
, and
T = c
′′d
δ
log
„
ǫ
′ d|P|
δβ
«
,
where c, c
′ and c
′′ are positive constants independent of ǫ, β,
and d. Then, in every phase consisting of T rounds starting
with a ﬂow vector f
0, there exists a round t ∈ {1,...,T}
with ﬂow vector f(t) that satisﬁes one of the following three
properties.
(1) The population f(t) is not at a δ
′-ǫ
′-equilibrium or
(2) the potential decreases by at least
2 δ′
d+1
¯ ℓ(f
0), i.e., Φ(f
0)−
Φ(f) ≥
2 δ′
d+1
¯ ℓ(f
0) or(3) the population is a (1+ǫ)-approximation of the optimal
potential, i.e., Φ(f(t)) ≤ (1 + ǫ)Φ
∗.
Let us give an intuition of the proof. Unless the phase con-
tains a round t satisfying property (2), we can use Lemma 7
to ﬁx the value of the average within a small interval around
its initial value throughout the phase. Then we can par-
tition the paths into categories according to their latency.
The ﬁrst category contains all paths with latency at most
(1 − δ) ¯ ℓ(f
0). We show that within one phase, paths do not
change to the ﬁrst category from any other category. This
is, because the load of paths in the other categories is either
increasing or their latency is too large to drop to at most
(1 − δ) ¯ ℓ(f
0) within one round. Therefore, the total load
on δ-cheap paths must grow exponentially implying that we
quickly reach a conﬁguration f(t) which is either not a δ
′-
ǫ
′-equilibrium any more (i.e. f(t) satisﬁes property (1)) or
f(t) is a δ-equilibrium, which, together with Lemma 8, im-
plies that property (3) is satisﬁed. Due to space limitations
we leave the proof for the full version.
Theorem 10. Consider a symmetric single-resource in-
stance Γ and an initial ﬂow vector finit. If β ≤ ǫ/d, the
(α,β)-exploration-replication-policy generates a conﬁguration
with potential Φ ≤ (1 + ǫ)Φ
∗ + ǫα in at most
O
„
d
12
ǫ7 log
4
„
|E|
β
«
log
„
Φ(finit) + α
Φ∗ + α
««
rounds.
Proof. Again, by Fact 3, it is suﬃcient to prove the
theorem for the case α = 0 (see the ﬁrst paragraph of the
proof of Theorem 6). Consider a phase of length T as deﬁned
in Lemma 9. By Lemma 9, the phase terminates with one
of the following events after at most T rounds:
(1) The population is no longer at a δ
′-ǫ
′-equilibrium. By
Theorem 6, this can happen at most
T1 = O
„
d
ǫ′2δ′2 log
„
Φ(f
0)
Φ∗
««
times.
(2) The potential decreases by at least 2δ
′/(d + 1) ¯ ℓ(f
0).
This decreases the potential by a factor of at least
(1 − 2δ
′/(d + 1)). Therefore, this can happen at most
T2 = O
„
d
δ′ log
„
Φ(f
0)
Φ∗
««
times.
(3) The policy has reached a (1+ ǫ)-approximation of the
potential.
Hence, after at most T  max{T1,T2} rounds, event (3) must
occur.
3.2.2 General Symmetric Games
In the general symmetric case, a lemma similar to Lem-
ma 9 holds with modiﬁed deﬁnitions of δ, ǫ, δ
′, and T. We
leave the proof, which is more involved than in the symmet-
ric case, for the full version. The modiﬁed values imply the
following theorem:
Theorem 11. Consider a symmetric instance Γ and an
initial ﬂow vector finit. If β ≤ ǫ
2/(L
3 d
2), then the (α,β)-
exploration-replication-policy generates a conﬁguration with
potential Φ ≤ (1 + ǫ)Φ
∗ + ǫα in at most
poly
„
d,
1
ǫ
,L
«
ln
4
„
|E|
β
«
ln
„
Φ(finit) + α
Φ∗ + α
«
rounds.
Substituting Equation (1) for β, this yields the bound as
presented in Section 1.2. The proof is identical with the
proof of Theorem 10 with the modiﬁed deﬁnitions of δ, ǫ
′,
δ
′, and T. In addition, we use that |P| = O
`
|E|
L´
.
4. ASYMMETRIC GAMES
For the asymmetric, or multi-commodity, case, we gen-
eralize the bicriteria deﬁnition of approximate equilibria in
the following manner.
Definition 6 (δ-ǫ-equilibrium). For a ﬂow vector f,
for every commodity i ∈ [k], let P
+
i (δ) = {P ∈ Pi | ℓP(f) ≥
¯ ℓi(f) + δ¯ ℓ} denote the set of δ-expensive strategies and let
P
−
i (δ) = {P ∈ Pi | ℓP(f) ≤ ¯ ℓi(f) − δ¯ ℓ} denote the set of δ-
cheap strategies. The population f is called a δ-ǫ-equilibrium
iﬀ at most ǫ agents utilize δ-expensive and δ-cheap strategies.
The analysis of the time of convergence is slightly more in-
volved than in the symmetric case.
Theorem 12. Consider an asymmetric congestion game
Γ and an initial ﬂow vector finit. For the (α,β)-exploration-
replication policy, the number of rounds in which the pop-
ulation vector is not at a δ-ǫ-equilibrium w.r.t. Γ
+α (as
deﬁned in Fact 3) is bounded from above by
O
„
d
ǫ2 δ2 log
„
Φ(finit) + α
Φ∗ + α
««
.
In particular, this bound holds for α = β = 0 (and hence
Γ
+α = Γ).
Proof (Sketch). As in the proof of Theorem 6, it is
suﬃcient to consider the case α = 0. Again, we estimate
the virtual potential gain V. Consider a path P ∈ P. There
are two cases.
1. ℓP > ¯ ℓ 2/ǫ. By Markov’s inequality, at most a fraction
of ǫ/2 of the agents utilizes such paths. We ignore the
potential gain of these agents.
2. ℓP ≤ ¯ ℓ 2/ǫ. The remaining 1−ǫ/2 agents utilize these
paths. As long as we are not at a δ-ǫ-equilibrium,
there must be at least ǫ agents utilizing δ-expensive or
δ-cheap paths. Since at most ǫ/2 of them are in case
1, at least ǫ/2 of them are in this case.
Throughout the proof we only consider agents of the sec-
ond case. For these agents, the proof is an extension of the
proof of Theorem 6. Consider commodity i.
Case 1. At least an ǫ/4-fraction of the agents utilizes δ-
expensive paths. First, ﬁx one commodity i with total rate
ri.
Case 1a. In commodity i, at least ri/2 agents utilize δ-
expensive paths. As in case 1a of the proof of Theorem 6,this yields an expected contribution to the virtual potential
gain of
Vi ≥
ri λδ
2 ǫ
4d
¯ ℓ .
Case 1b. The number of agents in commodity i utilizing
δ-expensive paths in commodity i is xi ≤ ri/2. With an
argument similar as in the proof of Theorem 6 we see that
Vi ≥
λǫδ
2 ¯ ℓ
3d
 
xi(ri − xi)
2
r2
i
≥ xi
λǫδ
2 ¯ ℓ
12d
Now, summing up over all commodities, the virtual po-
tential gain is
V ≥
X
i∈[k]
Vi
≥
X
i∈[k]
min

ri
λδ
2 ǫ ¯ ℓ
4d
,xi
λǫδ
2 ¯ ℓ
12d
ﬀ
≥
λǫδ
2 ¯ ℓ
12d
X
i∈[k]
xi
≥
λǫ
2 δ
2 ¯ ℓ
48d
.
Here, the minimum is over the two cases 1a and 1b.
Case 2. Again, cases 2a and 2b are symmetric.
5. LOWER BOUNDS
5.1 Relative Slope is Necessary
In this section we show that the relative slope is the rele-
vant parameter in our analysis. We provide a lower bound
that shows that for a class L of latency functions the rel-
ative slope d of L is a lower bound for the time of conver-
gence towards approximate equilibria if the rerouting policy
is monotone in the following sense. A policy is monotone
for a class of latency functions L if for every instance with
latency functions taken from L and for every feasible ﬂow
vector f, the policy does not increase the value of the po-
tential in one round. It is Markovian if the policy maintains
no state and the migration rates only depend on the current
ﬂow vector.
Theorem 13. For every d, there exists a class L of la-
tency functions with relative slope d together with an ini-
tial ﬂow vector f, such that any Markovian rerouting policy
monotone for L requires Ω(d/
√
ǫ) rounds in order to obtain
a (1 + ǫ) approximation to the optimum potential.
Proof. We choose a latency function ℓ : [0,1]  → R≥0
and numbers x,y ∈ [0,1],
√
ǫ ≤ x < y, such that the relative
slope of ℓ in the interval (x,y) is at least d. We deﬁne the
class Lℓ := {ℓ+a | a ∈ [0,ℓ(1)]}∪{a | a ∈ [0,ℓ(1)]} to contain
all constant latency functions in the interval [0,ℓ(1)] and all
latency functions that can be obtained by adding a constant
from this interval to ℓ.
Now, consider an instance with two strategies each con-
sisting of one resource with a constant latency function. De-
ﬁne the latency function of the ﬁrst resource as ℓ1(f1) =
L1 := ℓ(y)/(1 +
√
ǫ), and the latency function of the sec-
ond resource as ℓ2(f2) = L2 := ℓ(y). Clearly, the global
optimum puts all ﬂow on resource one which results in a
potential Φ
∗ = L1.
Assume a starting conﬁguration where the ﬂows f1 and
f2 for the two strategies are f1 = 1 − y and f2 = y. The
potential of a ﬂow vector f
′ is Φ(f
′) = L1   f
′
1 + L2   f
′
2. In
order to obtain a (1 + ǫ)-approximation to Φ
∗ the ﬂow f2
over resource 2 must drop from its initial value y to a value
less or equal to
√
ǫ.
Consider a conﬁguration f
′ with f
′
2 ∈ [x,y]. The rerout-
ing process must guarantee that it does not increase the
potential for all possible latency functions in Lℓ. Since the
process is Markovian, it has no knowledge about ℓ1 and ℓ2
but can only observe the values ℓ1(f
′
1) and ℓ2(f
′
2).
In particular, the process must assume that the latency
function of resource 2 is ˜ ℓ(f2) = ℓ(f2) + c where c ≥ 0 is
chosen such that ˜ ℓ(f
′
2) = L2. Since c ≤ L2 − L1 and since
the relative slope of ℓ at f
′
2 is at least d, we know that the
relative slope of ˜ ℓ at f
′
2 is at least d/2 in the interval [x,y].
Hence, the rerouting policy may move at most
∆ = O
„
ℓ2 − ℓ1
ℓ1
1
d
f1
«
= O
„√
ǫ
d
f1
«
agents from strategy 2 to strategy 1. Since we started with a
population of y utilizing strategy 2, it takes at least (y−x)/∆
rounds until the population utilizing this strategy decreases
to below x.
The proof shows that the theorem actually holds for any
L containing at least one function ℓ that has relative slope
d on an interval of constant width plus all functions ℓ+c for
constants c > 0 and the constant functions.
5.2 Sampling with Static Probabilities is Slow
The following theorem shows that every rerouting policy
that samples with static probabilities that are independent
of the latency functions needs at least Ω(|P|) rounds to ap-
proach a Wardrop equilibrium. We will formalize the no-
tion of static sampling probabilities in the following way. If
strategy P is sampled with static probability σP, at most
(1−fP)σP agents may migrate towards P in one round since
(1−fP) agents utilize other paths. We say that a rerouting
policy has static sampling probabilities (for a set of strategies
P) denoted by (σP)P∈|P| with
P
P∈Pi σP = 1 for all i ∈ [k],
if for every feasible ﬂow vector f, every commodity i ∈ [k],
and every strategy P ∈ Pi it holds that the total volume
of ﬂow that the policy shifts to strategy P in one round is
bounded from above by σP(ri − fP).
Theorem 14. For every m, there exist a set of resources
E with |E| = m and strategy set P with |P| = 2
m/4 such
that for every rerouting policy with static sampling probabil-
ities for P there exist a set of latency functions (ℓe)e∈E and
an initial population such that the rerouting policy needs at
least Ω(|P|log(1/ǫ)) rounds to reach a (1+ǫ)-approximation
of the optimal potential for the symmetric instance Γ =
(E,P,(ℓe)).
Proof. Consider a directed network G = (V,E) with
node set V = {s,t,v1,...,vn,w1,...,wn}. The edge set
consists of the edges (s,v1), (s,w1), (w1,t), (wn,t) and, for
1 ≤ i < n, (vi,vi+1), (vi,wi+1), (wi,vi+1), and (wi,wi+1).
This network has m = 4n resources and |P| = 2
n = 2
m/4
paths. Edges in this network correspond to resources and
paths correspond to strategies.
Let (σP)P∈P be the vector of sampling probabilities cho-
sen by the rerouting policy and let ˜ P be the strategy that
minimizes σP. Then, σP ≤ 1/|P|.For e ∈ {(s,v1),(s,w1),(w1,t),(wn,t)}, let ℓe = 0. For
every resource e ∈ P with s,t / ∈ e, let ℓe = 1. For all other
resources e
′, let ℓe′ = n. Hence, strategy ˜ P is the unique
optimal strategy with constant latency n−1 and Φ
∗ = n−1.
All other strategies have latency at least 2n − 2. In order
to reach a (1 + ǫ) approximation of Φ
∗, the population on
˜ P must be at least 1 − ǫ and hence the population on the
remaining strategies must be at most ǫ. By our choice of ˜ P,
we have
f ˜ P(t + 1) ≤ f ˜ P(t) + (1 − f ˜ P(t))σ ˜ P ≤ f ˜ P(t) +
1 − f ˜ P(t)
|P|
or, writing ¯ f ˜ P = 1 − f ˜ P,
¯ f ˜ P(t + 1) ≥ ¯ f ˜ P(t) −
¯ f ˜ P(t)
|P|
= ¯ f ˜ P(t)
„
1 −
1
|P|
«
.
Therefore, ¯ f ˜ P(t) ≥ f ˜ P(0) (1−1/|P|)
t implying that it takes
Ω(|P|log(1/ǫ)) rounds until ¯ f ˜ P(t) < ǫ and hence f ˜ P ≥ 1−ǫ
if we choose f ˜ P(0) > 0 constant.
6. OPEN PROBLEMS
Let us say that an agent is almost satisﬁed if her latency
is within a factor of 1 + δ of the average latency in the
same commodity. In the symmetric case, our bicriteria re-
sult for the replication protocol has an intuitive interpreta-
tion: Replication approximately satisﬁes almost all agents
very quickly. Unfortunately, our deﬁnition of δ-ǫ-equilibria
from Section 4 does not allow to extend this intuition to
asymmetric games. Can one obtain a similar result for the
multi-commodity case?
Is it possible to achieve a polynomial upper bound on the
time of convergence of the replication-exploration protocol
or a protocol of similar ﬂavor w.r.t. the potential in the
multi-commodity case?
In a discrete setting, our replication-exploration proto-
col would require an exponential number of agents as the
strategy space can be exponentially large in the number of
resources. Is it possible to explore the large strategy space
in a distributed fashion with a smaller (polynomial) number
of agents?
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